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ARTICLE
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Jorge L. Contreras, Bronwyn H. Hall, & Christian Helmers
ABSTRACT
Commons and pledge structures have been used to achieve
various goals of patent holders, including the advancement of
social and philanthropic aims. This Article, for the first time,
analyzes the formation and structure of a widely acclaimed effort
to pool patents for the promotion of green/clean technologies—the
Eco-Patent Commons (EcoPC)—as well as its actual impact on
technology diffusion and the factors leading to its demise in 2016.
We combine quantitative econometric techniques with qualitative
interviews to paint the most complete picture of this innovative
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and ambitious effort to date. Our quantitative results show that
the patents contributed to the EcoPC were, on average, less cited
than comparable patents, and that the contribution of these
patents to the EcoPC did not increase their rates of citation.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the availability of these
patents through the EcoPC increased the diffusion of pledged
inventions. Our interviews revealed significant structural and
organizational issues that limited both the attractiveness of the
EcoPC to new participants and its value to potential users of
pledged technology. Our findings have implications for the
effectiveness of patent commons in enabling the diffusion of
patented technologies more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION

The role of patents in promoting, or hindering, the mitigation
of global climate change and environmental degradation is
uncertain and increasingly contested. In Vice President Al Gore’s
2017 film, An Inconvenient Sequel: Truth to Power,1 Mr. Gore
portrays the negotiations leading up to the 2015 Paris Agreement
on international climate change.2 In one segment, he focuses on a
standoff between the government of India, a major carbon emitter,
and other countries. In attempting to mediate the standoff, Mr.
Gore seeks to broker a trade: India would give up its national coal
power plan, and U.S. tech company SolarCity would pledge its
solar technology patents for royalty-free use in the developing
world.3 This commitment of patents would, presumably, enable
India to implement environmentally friendly solar technology in
lieu of its carbon-spewing coal-powered plants.
According to the film, the SolarCity patent pledge was
inspired by a similar commitment made by Elon Musk, the
outspoken CEO of Tesla Motors.4 In 2014, Musk famously blogged
that “All Our Patent Are Belong To You,” seemingly contributing
Tesla’s valuable patent portfolio to the world at no cost.5 Though
it remains unclear whether SolarCity ever pledged its patents and

1. AN INCONVENIENT SEQUEL: TRUTH TO POWER (Participant Media and Actual
Films 2017).
2. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016).
3. SolarCity is reported to have a substantial patent portfolio. See Matthew Rimmer,
Elon Musk’s Open Innovation: Tesla, Intellectual Property, and Climate Change, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLEAN ENERGY 515, 540–41 (Matthew Rimmer ed., 2018).
4. Tesla acquired SolarCity in 2016 for approximately $2 billion. Prior to the
acquisition, Musk was the chairman of SolarCity and the cousin of its CEO Lyndon Rive.
Danielle Muoio, It’s Official: Tesla’s Acquisition of SolarCity Has Closed, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 21, 2016, 9:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-solarcity-deal-closes-2016
-11 [https://perma.cc/3JA2-GRK2].
5. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA (June 12, 2014), https://
www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.cc/PQ6D-P47Q]; see also
Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 544–45 (2015) [hereinafter
Contreras, Patent Pledges] (introducing Tesla pledge); Jorge L. Contreras, The Evolving
Patent Pledge Landscape, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, Apr. 2018, at 1, 3
[hereinafter Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape], https://www.cigionline.org/
sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.166%20Cover_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUA2-25
AE] (discussing evolution of Tesla pledge over time).
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whether any deal in Paris was brokered by Mr. Gore,6 the episode
brings to the forefront the potential role that patents can play in
fostering the development of technologies to mitigate global
climate change.
In the area of climate change mitigation and other green/clean
technology (green/clean tech), a variety of proposals to increase
innovation and diffusion of technology have been made, many of
them involving adjustments to the patent system.7 Such proposals
have encompassed strategies to increase the number of green/
clean tech patents to encourage private sector investment in
innovation and to decrease either the number or potency of such
patents in an effort to reduce the costs of innovation globally. In
the first category (enhancing patenting), proposals have been
made to accelerate or “fast track” patent applications for green/
clean tech inventions,8 and to aggregate patents into an
international licensing organization situated to tax greenhouse
gas emitters.9 In the category of decreasing the strength of, or
increasing access to the technology covered by, green/clean tech
patents, proposals have been made for: the compulsory licensing
of green/clean tech patents by governments;10 the exercise of
6. See, e.g., Chris White, Top Indian Official Refutes Claim that Al Gore Sealed
India’s Inclusion in Paris Deal, DAILY CALLER (July 25, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://dailycaller.
com/2017/07/25/top-indian-official-refutes-claim-that-al-gore-sealed-indias-inclusion-in-pa
ris-deal/ [https://perma.cc/T3XP-2DVG]; Emily Atkin, The Troubling Return of Al Gore,
NEW REPUBLIC (July 24, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143966/troubling-return-algore-profile-inconvenient-sequel [https://perma.cc/UTM9-YK5N].
7. Some commentators are skeptical that patent-based incentive mechanisms will
have a meaningful effect on the development and dissemination of new technologies to
address climate change. See, e.g., ERIC L. LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN INNOVATION 236–37 (2011) (“[T]ransfer and
implementation of clean technologies is happening, again and again, despite what the
debating parties may think or say. . . . Intellectual property protection did not prove a
barrier to these agreements and transactions.”); Ofer Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate
Change: A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENVTL. L. 211, 222–25 (2018) (favoring incentive mechanisms
such as prizes and subsidies).
8. See Anthony E. Chavez, Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of
Geoengineering Inventions, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 31–32 (2015); Patrick
Gattari, The Role of Patent Law in Incentivizing Green Technology, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 41, 44 (2013); Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Fast-Tracking Green Patent
Applications: An Empirical Analysis, INT’L CTR. TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Feb. 2013),
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2013/02/fast-tracking-green-patent-app
lications-an-empirical-analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/96V9-V73D] (describing fast-tracking
programs around the world).
9. See John Vendenberg et al., Using Patents to Curtail Climate Change: A Proposal,
LAW360 (Feb. 23, 2015, 10:18 AM), https://www.law360.com/amp/articles/622594.
10. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 8, at 21–27 (discussing benefits and practical
difficulties of compulsory licensing approaches); Jerome Reichman et al., Intellectual
Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green Innovation 30–33 (Chatham House Energy,
Env’t and Dev. Programme Working Paper No. 08/03, 2008) (“[T]he primary defensive
options for developing countries would reside in article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which
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governmental march-in rights;11 the acquisition of green/clean
tech patents by a fund which would make them freely (or more
broadly) available;12 an exemption from patent infringement for
noncommercial research and experimental use;13 the statutory
exclusion of some green/clean technologies from the scope of patent
protection;14 and constraints on the exclusive licensing of green/
clean tech inventions.15 At the extreme end of environmental
activism, calls have been made to abolish patents entirely.16 In this
Article, we examine a private ordering approach to incentivizing
the dissemination of green/clean technologies: the collective patent
pledge, or commons.
Although patents give their owners the right to exclude others
from practicing a patented technology or to charge them for the
privilege of doing so,17 an increasing number of firms across
different industries have begun to make voluntary pledges
intended to limit their ability to enforce their patents to the fullest

allows compulsory licenses to be issued on patented inventions for almost any reason,
subject to the payment of compensation and certain other technical prerequisites.”). But see
Charles R. McManis & Jorge L. Contreras, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property:
A Viable Policy Lever for Promoting Access to Critical Technologies?, in TRIPS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TOWARDS A NEW IP WORLD ORDER? 109, 112–13, 127–30 (Gustavo
Ghidini et al. eds., 2014) (questioning advisability and effectiveness of compulsory licensing
in clean/green tech area).
11. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 301, 354–56 (2011) (suggesting that governmental march-in criteria be clarified and
expanded in this area).
12. See Matthew Rimmer, The Paris Agreement: Intellectual Property, Technology
Transfer, and Climate Change, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLEAN ENERGY: THE PARIS
AGREEMENT AND CLIMATE JUSTICE 33, 39–40 (Matthew Rimmer ed., 2018) (describing the
Green Climate Fund); Chavez, supra note 8, at 32–35 (urging the U.S. government to
facilitate formation of a “climate-engineering patent pool” that would grant licenses broadly
at accessible rates).
13. See Jesse L. Reynolds et al., Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property:
Toward a Research Commons, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 45–46 (2017) (applying the
historical exemption to patentability of natural phenomena to climate innovations);
Sarnoff, supra note 11, at 344–48.
14. See Sarnoff, supra note 11, at 336–43 (proposing exclusion of basic R&D from
patentability); Shobita Parthasarathy et al., A Public Good? Geoengineering and
Intellectual Property 11–12 (Univ. of Mich. Gerald R. Ford Sch. of Pub. Pol’y Sci., Tech. &
Pub. Pol’y Program, Working Paper No. 10-1, 2010) (recommending that geoengineering
patents, especially those related to mechanisms to combat climate change, be narrow, if
awarded at all).
15. See Sarnoff, supra note 11, at 352–54.
16. See Mark Read, Al Gore’s Convenient Infomercial, INDYPENDENT, Sept. 2017, at
15 (“If we are to survive as a species, the legal, economic and cultural structures that
privilege private ownership of intellectual property over the interests of the many must be
challenged and fought at every turn. This must become a cornerstone of our fight for a more
just and sustainable future. If we do not pull this system out by its roots, it is going to kill
us all and our children.”).
17. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
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degree.18 Yet the pledging of patents, even to the extent that they
will not be asserted against infringers, stops short of abandoning
or contributing them to the public domain.19 Thus, under a pledge
model, also referred to as a patent commons, patent assets are
retained by their owners, who continue to incur maintenance and
other fees, but the use of such patents for traditional exclusionary
purposes is significantly curtailed.20
Patent commons differ from other mechanisms used to share
patents, including cross-licensing agreements and patent pools, in
important ways. For example, in both cross-licensing agreements
and patent pools, access to patents is granted only to participating
companies, although in the case of patent pools, outsiders often
can also access the pooled patents for a fee.21 The main difference
between these structures and further-reaching mechanisms, like
the patent commons, therefore, is that the commons typically
confers benefits on all third parties, regardless of their
contribution to the commons and typically without a formal
contract or payment.22
Patent pledges are made for a variety of reasons, including
the promotion of broad product interoperability through common
technical standards, the advocacy of new technology platforms,
and the pursuit of social goals.23 Over the past few decades,
significant patent pledges have been made in areas such as open
source software (e.g., IBM, Sun, Google and Red Hat (now owned
by IBM) have each pledged that they will not assert hundreds of
18. Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 545–46.
19. Several large patent holders, including IBM, have a well-articulated strategy for
abandoning unused patents. See Dennis Crouch, IBM’s Patent Abandonment Strategy,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 1, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/ibms-patent-abandonme
nt-strategy.html [https://perma.cc/9EL2-TEC5]; Bridget Diakun, Inside the IBM Patent
Factory, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (May 9, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/patents/insideibm-patent-factory (“Although IBM invests heavily in building its portfolio, it actively
abandons patents to streamline its holdings.”). Other coordinated industry efforts have
contributed substantial intellectual property assets to the public domain for self-interested
purposes. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets
Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 434–37 (2009).
20. Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons,
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. [hereinafter EcoPC Contributions], http://
www.otromundoesposible.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/E25F-P5K6] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (containing so-called “defensive
suspension” provisions that allow pledging companies to deny royalty-free access to other
companies that assert their patents against the pledging firm, suggesting that some patents
are held for purely defensive purposes rather than as exclusionary rights).
21. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not To Join: Examining Patent
Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 294, 296 (2011).
22. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 546.
23. See id. at 572–74, 594; Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note
5, at 4–5.
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patents against open source software implementations); electric
vehicles (in addition to Tesla Motors’ famous pledge, Toyota has
made a significant pledge of patents covering its hydrogen cell
vehicles);24 and biotechnology (e.g., Monsanto’s pledge not to
assert patents covering genetically modified seeds against farmers
inadvertently growing them).25 Over the years, some collective
patent pledges, pledge communities and patent commons have
achieved significant adoption in the marketplace, while others
have not. For example, from its inception in 2014 through late
2017, Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) network, in which
patent holders commit not to transfer their patents to patent
assertion entities (PAEs), attracted 180 members and more than
180,000 patents.26 In contrast, the Defensive Patent License (DPL)
network, which was launched in the same year with similar goals,
has attracted few members.27 The differences in take-up between
these two pledge communities can be attributed to a variety of
factors including internal governance mechanisms, commitment
details, and evangelization.28
Unlike patent pledges that seek to foster technology or
platform adoption, some pledges are made in support of
philanthropic or corporate social responsibility (CSR) goals. For
example, a number of patent pools seeking to improve access to
lifesaving drugs in the developing world have emerged over the
years. These pools, which include the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP)
and The Pool for Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical
Diseases (NTD Pool), also include major pharmaceutical
companies who participate largely in a philanthropic capacity
(with concomitant public relations (PR) benefits).29
The EcoPC was an innovative not-for-profit initiative
undertaken by a small group of industrial firms with the goal of
pledging “green technology” patents for broad, royalty-free use in

24. Toyota Opens the Door and Invites the Industry to the Hydrogen Future, TOYOTA
USA NEWSROOM (Jan. 5, 2015), https://pressroom.toyota.com/toyota-fuel-cell-patents-ces2015/ [https://perma.cc/AX8N-JQB5]; see also Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at
544 (discussing Toyota pledge).
25. See generally Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 5, at 1–2;
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 545.
26. The LOT Network Community, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/our-community/
#member-list [https://perma.cc/Q9CJ-65Z8] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
27. See Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 5, at 5–6.
28. See id.
29. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 590–93 (describing philanthropic
motivation for pledges); Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
103, 121–27 (2012) (discussing MPP and NTD Pool).
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addressing environmental challenges.30 The thirteen EcoPC
participants collectively pledged a total of 248 “green technology”
patents (94 priority patents or distinct inventions) to the EcoPC
between its formation in 2008 and its discontinuation in 2016.31
When created, the EcoPC had the ambitious stated objective
of promoting the diffusion of green technologies to increase and
accelerate their adoption and to encourage follow-on innovation.
The theoretical mechanism to achieve this was simple: by
suspending a patent owner’s ability to assert a patent against any
users of the patented technology, the technology—which had
already been disclosed by the patent publication—would become
available for royalty-free use by any interested party. In principle,
this mechanism could address the well-known welfare cost
associated with temporary market power granted by patents that
likely slows the diffusion of patented technology.32 A second
possible benefit was that those building on the contributed
technologies might find other (commercial) outputs of the
contributing firm useful, or might add to a knowledge base from
which the firm would benefit.33
Following its creation, the EcoPC attracted substantial
attention in the scholarly literature,34 the popular press,35 and the

30. Dechezleprêtre, supra note 8.
31. See infra notes 41, 55 and accompanying text. Patents are territorial rights. That
is, separate patents on the same invention have to be obtained in each jurisdiction where
patent protection is desired. This means that there often exist multiple patents on the same
invention, which are referred to as equivalents or members of a patent “family.” The
“priority” patent in such a family is the first patent filed within a given set of equivalents.
32. Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, The Role of Patent Protection in
(Clean/Green) Technology Transfer 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16323, 2010).
33. Sharon Belenzon, Knowledge Flow and Sequential Innovation: Implications for
Technology Diffusion, R&D and Market Value 5–7 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Working
Paper No. 721, 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=893060 [https://perma.cc/R6Q6-N9GA].
Belenzon shows that it is profitable for a primary firm to cite a patent by a secondary firm
if the instant patent cites the primary firm’s patent. The market values the mutual citations
and the benefits of the feedback loop spill over to the primary firm. See id.
34. See, e.g., Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: A Donation Approach
Encouraging Innovation Within the Patent System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
659, 679–82 (2011); Mattioli, supra note 29, at 142–43; Mark Van Hoorebeek & William
Onzivu, The Eco-Patent Commons and Environmental Technology Transfer: Implications
for Efforts to Tackle Climate Change, 2010 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 13, 13.
35. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Companies to Share Eco-Friendly Patents, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2008, at B2; Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU5.
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blogosphere.36 Even environmental activist groups such as
Greenpeace had good things to say about the project.37
But in addition to accolades, the EcoPC attracted some
skepticism regarding its potential effectiveness. This skepticism
focused, among other things, on whether a commons could offer
sufficient incentives to attract valuable patent pledges and
thereby achieve its ambitious goals.38
In contrast to other mechanisms designed to share patents,
such as cross-licensing and patent pools, patent owners in the
EcoPC maintained ownership of their patents (which is costly)39
while making those patents freely accessible to third parties,
including competitors. Some competitive safeguards were left in
place, notably a defensive termination right in case a different
patent was asserted against the pledger by a firm using the
patented technology. For these reasons, it was not obvious what
benefits the commons offered to participants beyond reputational
enhancement. This, in turn, meant that participants could have
had incentives to minimize their costs by pledging only patents
with little commercial value and allowing them to lapse shortly
after they were pledged.40
In an earlier study, Hall and Helmers studied the
characteristics of the patents pledged to the EcoPC.41 Their study
confirmed that the pledged patents did claim environmentally
friendly technologies. Moreover, pledged patents were of similar
value to other patents in the pledging firm’s portfolio, but of lower
value than other patents in their class, using the usual patent
value indicators (based on citations, family size, number of patent
technology classes, etc.). The findings suggested that the EcoPC
participants might have pledged patents with the potential to

36. See, e.g., David Bollier, New Eco-Patent Commons, DAVID BOLLIER (Feb. 8, 2008,
12:00 AM), http://www.bollier.org/new-eco-patent-commons [https://perma.cc/L767-UENN]
(“The idea, inspired by open source software and the Creative Commons, is to promote more
eco-friendly manufacturing and waste-reduction processes. Bravo to IBM, Nokia, Sony and
Pitney Bowes!”).
37. See, e.g., Bulkeley, supra note 35, at B2 (quoting John Coequyt, an energy policy
specialist with the Washington office of Greenpeace, who praised the EcoPC as a potential
“way to solve the [global warming] problem by voluntary action”).
38. See Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Sink or Swim: Eco-Patent Commons and the Transfer
of Environmentally Sustainable Technologies, BIORES TRADE & ENV’T REV., May 2008, at
14, 16.
39. The EcoPC participants were not, however, required to continue to pay
maintenance fees on pledged patents. See infra Section IV.B (discussing lapse of patents
for nonpayment of maintenance fees).
40. See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying discussion (examples of patents
pledged).
41. Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Innovation and Diffusion of Clean/Green
Technology: Can Patent Commons Help?, 66 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 33 (2013).
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diffuse environmentally friendly technologies that were possibly
useful to other firms and researchers.
To study whether the EcoPC increased the diffusion of green
technologies, Hall and Helmers looked for changes in forward
citations to pledged patents following their addition to the
commons. They constructed a set of control patents that matched
the publication authorities, priority years, and technology classes
of the EcoPC patents. They examined the pattern of citations by
subsequent patent applications to the set of EcoPC patents and
their controls over time, before and after contribution and found
that the EcoPC patents tended to be cited less than the patents in
the control group before contribution to the EcoPC. However, the
results after contribution were inconclusive because most of the
patents were contributed in late 2008 and there was little data
post-pledge as citation data was available only through early 2012,
leaving little more than three years of citation data post-pledge.
In this Article, we assess the effect of the EcoPC on technology
diffusion and assess its impact more broadly, using several
approaches. The first is a set of interviews with participants in the
EcoPC and those responsible for it, described in Part III. These
interviews provide helpful qualitative information that allows us
to better understand the underlying causes of the EcoPC’s failure
to encourage the diffusion of pledged technologies. The second is
an updated look at the data on the patents pledged to the EcoPC,
described mainly in Part IV. With the passage of time,
substantially more citation data has become available (through
2016 as opposed to early 2012 in Hall and Helmers’ earlier study).
This allows us to reexamine the data and provide a more definitive
answer to the question of whether the commons had any effect on
technology diffusion, at least as reflected in subsequent patenting.
The fact that several new commons were created at the same time
the EcoPC was discontinued in 2016,42 also motivates us to revisit
the viability of such patent commons more generally. Finally, we
asked inventors of the patents that cited any of the EcoPC patents
after they were pledged about the role that the pledge played in
their decision to rely on an EcoPC patent as prior art.
To summarize our main findings: we do not find any evidence
that the EcoPC increased the diffusion of pledged patents. Pledged
patents were cited less than the matched control patents before
they entered the commons, suggesting that they were already less
valuable, and their pledge does not change this. Inventors of citing
patents unanimously indicated that the pledge, i.e., royalty-free
42.

See infra note 63.
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access, did not affect their decision to rely on an EcoPC patent as
prior art. In fact, none of the inventors that responded to our query
were even aware that the cited patent was part of the EcoPC, and
hence, royalty-free access played no role in their decision to rely
on it as prior art. These results suggest that the commons had no
effect on technology diffusion. Looking at the EcoPC priority
patents, 82% had lapsed by July 2017 (26% expired, 18% were
rejected or withdrawn, and 38% lapsed because of renewal fee
nonpayment). Expired patents were not replaced by new patent
pledges. This indicates that participating companies, in most
cases, did not consider the benefits of the commons sufficiently
large to maintain the patents in force. Our interviews with
representatives of the EcoPC participants reveal several common
critiques of the EcoPC’s structure and operational processes that
help explain our quantitative findings, particularly EcoPC’s
inability to provide information regarding the usage of contributed
technologies.43 Another major impediment to diffusion was the
lack of information provided by pledging companies beyond the
patent documents that could have helped potential users
(especially in developing countries) see potential applications of
the pledged technologies. Finally, no concerted effort was made to
group or link patents in the commons to any particular technology.
This lack of coordination may have limited synergies that could
have been created through a more deliberate approach to the
technologies covered by contributed patents.
This study both updates Hall and Helmers’ previous study
and fills gaps in our understanding of the functioning and
performance of the EcoPC and patent commons more generally.
Providing a more definitive answer to the question of diffusion and
the functioning of the EcoPC more broadly is important for three
reasons. First, it offers insight regarding the manner in which
patent pledges can support the diffusion and implementation of
(green) technologies around the world. Second, it can inform the
design of other pledge communities both in the environmental
space and other key technology areas, such as electric vehicles,
software, biotechnology, and agriculture. Third, it informs us more
generally about the viability of patent commons created by forprofit companies as a mechanism to share access to patented
technology.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part II
describes the institutional design and history of the EcoPC. Part
43. This feature of the commons also limits our ability to study subsequent use of the
pledged patents, which is why we chose to focus on publicly-available citations to these
patents.
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III summarizes the findings from our interviews of participants in
the EcoPC. In Part IV we turn to a quantitative analysis of these
patents and their citations and discuss the results of our inventor
survey. Finally, in Part V we analyze our findings and assess their
impact on the planning and design of future patent commons.
II. THE ECO-PATENT COMMONS: STRUCTURE AND
DEVELOPMENT44
The concept of the EcoPC as a collective mechanism for
permitting broad usage of patents covering environmental
technologies was originally developed by IBM in the mid-2000s as
one of several corporate initiatives directed toward environmental
protection and sustainability.45 Given IBM’s well-known patent
strength,46 a program to promote environmental causes would
capitalize on one of the company’s principal assets. IBM had
already made significant commitments to the sharing of patents
and other intellectual property (IP) in the area of open source code
software.47 Accordingly, extending these initiatives to the
environmental area was consistent with IBM’s existing corporate
culture.48
The idea behind the EcoPC was that industrial firms with
large patent portfolios likely hold patents covering technologies
44. The material in this part is derived both from the works cited and also from the
interviews described in Part III, below. Additional information regarding the organization
and history of the EcoPC can be found in Mattioli, supra note 29; see also Hall & Helmers,
supra note 41; Bassem Awad, Global Patent Pledges: A Collaborative Mechanism for
Climate Change Technology, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, Nov. 2015, at 1, 5–
6, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no.81.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV3K-QB6N].
45. See infra note 54.
46. According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics, IBM regularly receives
more U.S. patent grants than any other company in the world—over 7,000 patents in 2015
alone. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS (UTILITY
PATENTS) B1-1 (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_15.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/4G8K-H4UR].
47. See IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM (Jan.
11, 2005), http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/
73H7-VK8V]; see also Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 183, 188–94 (2004) (discussing IBM strategy related to patent non-assertion); Wen
Wen et al., Patent Commons, Thickets, and Open Source Software Entry by Start-Up Firms
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19394, 2013), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w19394.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4M-MAHZ].
48. The EcoPC explicitly compared itself to the open source movement, noting in its
promotional materials that, “[a]s has been demonstrated by the open source software
community, the free sharing of knowledge can provide a fertile ground for new collaboration
and innovation. Sharing environmental patents can help others become more eco-efficient
and operate in a more environmentally sustainable manner—enabling technology
innovation to meet social innovation.” About the Eco-Patent Commons, ECO-PATENT
COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org/about-eco-patent-commons [http://web.archive.or
g/web/20161025065740/http://ecopatentcommons.org/about-eco-patent-commons].
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with environmental applications, but because those technologies
are not core to the firm’s business, they are languishing unused.49
If, however, the patents covering these technologies could be made
freely available to users around the world, then a significant public
service could be rendered at a minimal cost to the patent holder.
IBM publicly announced the concept for the EcoPC at its
Global Innovation Outlook conference in 2006.50 It then initiated
discussions with other large firms with which it had existing
business ties and which it believed might be sympathetic to a
collective approach to making environmental technologies more
broadly available. In January 2008, IBM announced the launch of
the EcoPC together with Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Sony.51 A total
of thirteen firms eventually joined the EcoPC as summarized in
Table 1, below.

49. Numerous studies have shown that many patents in corporate portfolios go
unused. See, e.g., Paolo Giuri et al., Inventors and Invention Processes in Europe: Results
from the PatVal-EU Survey, 36 RES. POL’Y 1107 (2007) (average 37% non-use by European
patent holders); Salvatore Torrisi et al., Used, Blocking and Sleeping Patents: Empirical
Evidence from a Large-Scale Inventor Survey, 45 RES. POL’Y 1374, 1379 (2016) (“Japan
shows the largest share of unused patents (46%) compared to Europe (38%) and the U.S.
(36%)”); Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of Patents in
Japan and the US: Major Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey (Research
Inst. of Econ., Trade and Indus., Discussion Paper No. 09-E-011, 2009) (35% non-use by
North American patent holders).
50. See Corporations Go Public with Eco-Friendly Patents, IBM NEWS ROOM (Jan. 14,
2008), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/23280.wss [https://perma.cc/92XX
-WJWK].
51. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156

57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019)

74

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:1

Table 1: Firm Participation in the EcoPC52
Firm

Date Joining EcoPC

IBM
Nokia
Pitney Bowes
Sony
Bosch
DuPont**
Xerox
Taisei
Ricoh
Dow
Fuji Xerox
Hewlett-Packard
Hitachi**

Jan. 14, 2008
Jan. 14, 2008
Jan. 14, 2008
Jan. 14, 2008
Sept. 8, 2008
Sept. 8, 2008
Sept. 8, 2008
Mar. 23, 2009
Mar. 23, 2009
Oct. 20, 2009
Oct. 20, 2009
July 1, 2010
July 25, 2011

No. Patents
Pledged*
29
1
2
4
24
11
13
2
1
1
2
3
1

* Priority patents (i.e., patent families).
** DuPont and Hitachi withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013, as of the transfer of EcoPC’s
management from WBCSD to ELI.

The stated mission of EcoPC was “to manage a collection of
patents pledged for unencumbered use by companies and IP rights
holders around the world to make it easier and faster to innovate
and implement industrial processes that improve and protect the
global environment.”53 Accordingly, patents eligible for inclusion
in the EcoPC were required to belong to one of sixty enumerated
International Patent Classification (IPC) codes relating to
environmental or sustainability technology. Technologies sought
by the EcoPC included energy conservation, pollution control,
environmentally-friendly materials, water or materials use or
reduction, and recyclability.54 Two hundred forty-eight patents
were pledged to the EcoPC, with the last such contribution
occurring in 2011.55
To pledge a patent to the EcoPC, the owner was required to
make an irrevocable covenant not to assert the patent—or “any
52. E-PC All Pledged Patent, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org
/sites/default/files/docs/ecopatent-database.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20170304221
125/http://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/default/files/docs/ecopatent-database.pdf].
53. EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20.
54. The Eco-Patent Commons: A Leadership Opportunity for Global Business to
Protect the Planet, LEAN BUS. IR. (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter EcoPC Brochure], https://www.le
anbusinessireland.ie/includes/documents/Eco-Patent%20Commons%20Brochure_011008%
5b1%5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4VE-X7N8].
55. See E-PC All Pledged Patent, supra note 52.
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worldwide counterparts”—against any infringing machine,
manufacture process or composition of matter that
“reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption, reduces/
eliminates waste generation or pollution, or otherwise provides
environmental benefit(s).”56 This being said, patent owners
retained the (defensive termination) right to assert pledged
patents against (a) any EcoPC participant that asserted any
environmental patent against them, or (b) any non-EcoPC
participant that asserted any patent against them.57
The initial administrator of the EcoPC was the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a
Geneva-based non-governmental organization focused on
environmental and sustainability issues.58 WBCSD’s initial duties
consisted primarily of hosting the EcoPC website and promoting
EcoPC to other WBCSD members for purposes of recruitment.
WBCSD publicized the EcoPC among its members and attracted
several of the participants that joined following the EcoPC’s
formation.59
Participation in the EcoPC was open to all individuals and
companies in the world, the only requirement for participation
being the pledging of one or more patents according to the EcoPC’s
rules.60 Neither membership in WBCSD nor any additional dues
or charges were required for EcoPC participation. The EcoPC itself
was characterized as an unincorporated, nonprofit association.61
In 2013, the administration of EcoPC was transferred from
WBCSD to the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), a Washington,
D.C.-based trade and advocacy organization.62 This transition was
apparently orchestrated by IBM, which had withdrawn as a
member of WBCSD, thereby eliminating the primary driver of
WBCSD’s involvement. ELI, of which IBM was a significant
56. EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20.
57. See EcoPC Brochure, supra note 54 (describing this as a “defensive termination”
provision).
58. See Overview, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://www.wbcsd.o
rg/Overview/About-us [https://perma.cc/CP5L-XKD5] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019); EcoPC
Brochure, supra note 54.
59. See supra note 52 and Table 1.
60. Members of the EcoPC were required to complete a Membership
Application/Pledge Form which bound them to comply with the EcoPC’s Non-Assert Pledge,
Ground Rules and Governance Structure. See EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20.
61. See EcoPC Brochure, supra note 54.
62. See Royalty Free Environmental Patents, ENVTL. L. INST. (Oct. 2013), http://
www. eli.org/news/royalty-free-environmental-patents [https://perma.cc/9BSV-YSGF]. See
generally About the Environmental Law Institute, ENVTL. L. INST., https://www.eli.org/
about-environmental-law-institute [https://perma.cc/3FTX-SJMQ] (last visited Sept. 12,
2019).
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member, hosted the EcoPC website from 2013 through 2016, but
was not actively engaged in recruiting new participants. Two
EcoPC members, Hitachi and DuPont, withdrew from the EcoPC
at the time of this administrative shift. No new patents were
contributed to the EcoPC after Hitachi’s initial 2011 contribution.
By 2016, very little activity was occurring at the EcoPC.
Accordingly, in 2016, the EcoPC was formally discontinued.63
Though the EcoPC has been shut down, pursuant to the
EcoPC Ground Rules and pledge terms, the “irrevocable” nonassertion pledge made with respect to each pledged patent will
continue in accordance with its terms indefinitely.64
III. INTERVIEWS
This Part describes the results of a series of semi-structured
interviews with representatives of participating companies,
WBCSD and ELI.65 Here we focus on the strengths and
weaknesses of the EcoPC that were identified by interviewees in
an attempt to inform our interpretation of our quantitative results
on the diffusion of pledged technologies.
A. Methodology
We identified individuals employed by EcoPC corporate
participants who had been personally involved with their
employer’s decision to join the EcoPC, its ongoing participation in
the EcoPC, or both. Through online searches and informal
inquiries, we were able to obtain valid and current contact details
for representatives of nine of the thirteen EcoPC corporate
participants. Seven of these individuals consented to be
interviewed for this study (five by telephone and two by written

63. Important Statement from the Board: Eco-Patent Commons to Cease Active
Operations Effective May 18, 2016, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, https://ecopatentcommons.org/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170805131334/https://ecopatentcommons.org/]. Based on
our interviews, see infra Part III, we understand that each EcoPC participant was consulted
by IBM regarding the decision to wind-down the EcoPC. Apparently, there was no
resistance to this course of action.
64. The Ground Rules make it clear that a patent owner’s EcoPC pledge will survive
that owner’s withdrawal from the EcoPC. See EcoPC Contributions, supra note 20
(“Voluntary or involuntary withdrawal shall not affect the non-assert as to any approved
pledged patent(s) – the non-assert survives and remains in force.”). For example, Hitachi
pledged a patent to the EcoPC in 2011, but withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013. This patent
should remain pledged. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 598.
65. Interviews were conducted by Contreras pursuant to a determination of “no
human subject research” by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board (Jun. 26,
2017, IRB 00102447). Interview subject information is held by Contreras.
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correspondence).66 In addition, we interviewed representatives of
WBCSD and ELI who were directly involved in EcoPC activities.67
Each interview subject responded to questions relating to his
or her employer’s reasons for joining the EcoPC; how patents were
selected for inclusion in the EcoPC; the company’s ongoing
engagement with the EcoPC; views regarding the discontinuation
of the EcoPC; the company’s overall satisfaction with the EcoPC;
whether the company’s goals in joining the EcoPC were achieved;
and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the EcoPC structure.
In addition, representatives of the WBCSD and ELI were asked
questions relating to their operation and management of the
EcoPC. These responses are summarized below.
The information gathered through these interviews is not
necessarily representative of the views held by all member
companies of the EcoPC as it is possible that interviewees selected
into our sample based their responses on their subjective views of
the performance of the EcoPC. That said, we obtained information
from a relatively diverse sampling of company representatives
(relative to the number of people involved in the project) across
different geographical regions (companies based in the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan) and are therefore optimistic that these
interviews offer relevant information in regard to a significant
portion of the EcoPC participants’ views regarding the
organization.
B. General Responses
1. Joining EcoPC. Based on the sample of EcoPC
participants interviewed, it appears that the primary drive to
participate in the EcoPC came from management within each
corporation’s environmental, sustainability, or corporate social
responsibility unit (for convenience, we refer to such business
units as “environmental and social responsibility” or ESR).
Although in most cases, the corporate legal or IP department was
consulted, it was not the primary internal champion of
participation in the EcoPC. In several cases, the decision to join
the EcoPC was made by an executive or manager within the ESR

66. The authors have agreed not to disclose the identities of either the individuals
interviewed or the EcoPC participant companies that they represented with the exception
of IBM given its central role in forming and managing the EcoPC.
67. Interview scripts differed for individuals representing EcoPC participants versus
administrators. Each interview lasted approximately thirty to sixty minutes. Responses
were coded by the interviewer. No compensation was offered to interview subjects.
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unit, with the legal department being involved only later (to help
identify suitable patents for contribution).
Given the origin of EcoPC participation in corporate ESR
units, it is not surprising that the rationales for joining the EcoPC
were largely focused on improving global environmental
conditions and sustainability. Several respondents mentioned a
corporate culture of ESR, while a few expressed a desire to ensure
that environmentally valuable technologies were made available
in the developing world. Responses evoked themes of both
environmental preservation/stewardship, as well as corporate
social responsibility.
With respect to each of the corporate EcoPC participants
other than IBM, the company was approached directly by a
representative of either IBM or the WBCSD regarding
participation in the EcoPC. In several cases, a personal
relationship at the managerial or executive level facilitated the
decision to participate.
One attractive feature that weighed in favor of joining the
EcoPC was the lack of any financial commitment on the part of the
participants. The only requirement for EcoPC participation was
the identification and contribution of one or more patents. Several
respondents indicated that their employers would probably not
have joined the EcoPC had a membership fee been required.
Probably due to the lack of a financial commitment, the corporate
approval required for joining the EcoPC was, in some cases,
handled at the level of the ESR unit. In at least one case, however,
the company was required to obtain corporate approval at the
board level.
It is interesting to note that none of the individuals that were
interviewed identified a PR benefit as a principal justification for
joining the EcoPC. While several interviewees acknowledged that
positive PR associated with the EcoPC may have contributed to
the decision to join, in particular at the executive level, the
principal support for EcoPC participation within firms originated
in, and was championed by, ESR business units with express goals
directed to environmental sustainability. This observation runs
counter to several prior analyses of the EcoPC, which speculated
that PR benefits may have been significant motivators for firms to
join.68 Indeed, even the promotional materials created by the
WBCSD to recruit additional EcoPC members emphasize these PR
68. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 5, at 591; Van Hoorebeek & Onzivu,
supra note 34, at 18.
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benefits.69 Yet, it seems that PR may have played a relatively
modest role in the decision of firms to join the EcoPC.
2. Selection of Patents. It was a starting premise of most
firms that the patents pledged to the EcoPC would not be central
to the firm’s commercial interests. In fact, this feature was a
“selling point” for membership in the commons: the patents that
would be contributed were not expected to “represent an essential
source of business advantage” for their owners.70 As explained by
one senior IBM executive, “[m]any patented environmental
technologies are not strategic, so sharing maximizes the social
benefit without sacrificing competitive advantage.”71 Thus, the
patents contributed to the EcoPC were largely tangential to the
primary business interests of the members. For example, IBM
pledged a patent relating to recyclable cardboard packaging for
electronic parts,72 Nokia contributed a patent for recycling
obsolete cellphones for use as calculators and personal digital
assistants,73 DuPont contributed a patented method for detecting
pollution in soil, air or water by using a photoluminescent
microorganism,74 and Pitney Bowes contributed a patent claiming
a design for electronic scales that are less likely to be damaged
when they are overloaded75 (a Pitney Bowes official explained that
the patent related to the environment because “if you have a
technology that extends the life of electronics, you keep it out of
the waste stream”).76
The manner in which specific patents were selected for
contribution to the EcoPC varied among participants. IBM,
reputedly the largest patent holder in the world, utilized a variety
of internal searching and analysis tools to determine which of its
patents were suitable candidates for contribution: both because
they fit into the EcoPC’s approved technology categories and were
not actively being commercialized by IBM. Other firms used
similarly sophisticated patent searching methodologies, including
analysis of external citations to patent documents to determine
whether patents had potential financial value. Some firms, even
those with large patent portfolios, used less formal approaches. In
69. See EcoPC Brochure, supra note 54.
70. See About the Eco Patent Commons, supra note 48.
71. See Tripsas, supra note 35 (quoting Wayne Balta, Vice President of Corporate
Environmental Affairs and Product Safety at IBM).
72. See U.S. Patent No. 6,997,323 (issued Feb. 14, 2006).
73. See U.S. Patent No. 7,251,458 (issued July 31, 2007).
74. See U.S. Patent No. 5,731,163 (issued Mar. 24, 1998).
75. See U.S. Patent No. 5,521,334 (issued May 28, 1996).
76. Bulkeley, supra note 35, at B2 (quoting Angelo Chaclas, Deputy General Counsel
of Pitney Bowes).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156

57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019)

80

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:1

one case, a patent was identified because a senior environmental
manager at the company was named as an inventor on it. Another
company asked its internal managers at the product division level
to recommend patents for contribution. At one company, the
majority of patents contributed originated within the ESR
business unit, which championed EcoPC membership within the
company. In all cases, EcoPC participants selected patents for
contribution through internal mechanisms and did not engage
external consultants or attorneys to assist with the search or
selection process, which also helped keep the costs of participating
in the EcoPC low.
3. Ongoing Engagement. All respondents indicated that a
meaningful, though not overwhelming, amount of effort was
required at the initiation of EcoPC participation, largely to
identify relevant patents to contribute. After that initial
determination was made, however, most firms (IBM being the
notable exception) indicated that they engaged very little with the
EcoPC. As noted above, there were occasional telephone
conferences during which participants were updated regarding the
EcoPC’s activities, but after 2011, when the last new member
joined, there was little in the way of updates. As noted above, none
of the individuals that were interviewed recalled participating in
any formal vote of EcoPC members, even when the decision to
wind down the organization was made. This being said, most of
the respondents did not object to this minimal level of involvement
and did not feel the need to be involved to a greater degree.
4. Discontinuation. Each respondent was satisfied with the
decision to wind down the EcoPC, indicating that the organization
had run its course and provided comparatively little value by the
time that it concluded. None of the respondents expressed
disappointment or disagreement with the decision to discontinue
the EcoPC. In fact, at least three respondents were unaware, at
the time they were interviewed, that the EcoPC had been
discontinued more than a year earlier, demonstrating that, at
least in these cases, the EcoPC was a fairly insignificant activity
for these companies.
C. Critiques of EcoPC
As noted above, most respondents viewed the EcoPC as a
valuable demonstration of corporate willingness to collaborate to
achieve environmental and sustainability goals. The PR benefits
of EcoPC participation were also viewed as valuable by some
companies. However, each of the respondents expressed
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dissatisfaction with at least some aspects of the EcoPC which
helps explain its failure to encourage the diffusion of the pledged
technologies and ultimately the EcoPC’s shutdown:
1. Membership and Recruitment. At its height in 2011, the
EcoPC had thirteen corporate participants.77 Though these firms
were all major global enterprises with large patent portfolios, they
still represented only a tiny fraction of the total potential
membership in the organization. Particularly given that the
EcoPC charged no membership fee, it was somewhat puzzling that
so few firms joined. While WBCSD did appear to promote
membership in the EcoPC, few of WBCSD’s many members
elected to join. Based on our discussions with EcoPC members, we
believe that possible impediments to recruitment were: (a) the
perceived difficulty and expense of identifying suitable patents for
contribution; (b) a belief among potential members that they
lacked patents that were suitable for contribution; and (c) an
aversion to the idea of contributing potentially valuable patents to
the EcoPC without compensation, a view generally held by legal
and IP departments in contrast to corporate divisions focused on
sustainability and corporate social responsibility.
2. No Tracking of Usage. All respondents observed that
there was no effective way to determine whether the technologies
covered by patents pledged to the EcoPC had been utilized.78 As a
result, it was difficult for them to draw conclusions regarding
whether the EcoPC was worth the effort, and to determine
whether the goals of improving environmental conditions and
sustainability were being met. Moreover, without clear success
metrics, it was difficult to justify devoting ongoing effort to the
EcoPC to upper management at some companies. Several
respondents indicated that the EcoPC made a conscious decision
not to require users to register with the website or report back to
the EcoPC, as such requirements would serve as barriers to use of
the website.
Running somewhat counter to these comments, one
interviewee noted that, in the early phase of the EcoPC, he/she
received informal approaches from potential users seeking to
understand the technology that had been made available through
the EcoPC. This respondent indicated that during group calls with
77. See supra note 52 and Table 1.
78. This weakness was identified by commentators soon after the EcoPC’s formation.
See Jo Bowman, The Eco-Patent Commons: Caring Through Sharing, WIPO MAG., June
2009, at 11, 12, https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2009/wipo_
pub_121_2009_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2V5-P6EN].
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EcoPC representatives, they would share information regarding
how many calls of this nature they had received. However, such
informal inquiries dropped off after the initial years of the EcoPC,
which may suggest that the technologies were no longer perceived
as useful.
WBCSD, at least initially, tracked hits to the EcoPC website
and shared this information with the participants.79 However, as
noted above, identifying information about visitors was not
collected, and it was not clear whether visitors were academics,
students, attorneys, journalists or potential users of the
technologies.
3. Notice of Available Technologies. It was noted by several
interviewees that the cataloging of patents on the EcoPC website,
which was organized by contributing company rather than
technology area, was not particularly intuitive or informative. It
required potential users to look up the relevant patents one by one
in order to understand the technology being offered. Moreover,
usually only a single patent family member was listed, requiring
users to identify the remaining patent family members
themselves. This procedure would have required both substantial
effort on the part of potential users, as well as a high degree of
familiarity with the format and terminology of patent
documents.80 As documented previously by Hall and Helmers, the
website also listed a number of erroneous patent numbers, another
potential source of frustration for users.81 Taken together, these
design shortfalls likely impeded the widespread usage of the
EcoPC’s resources.
4. Lack of Technology Transfer. Another issue raised by
several respondents was that the EcoPC sought to promote the
dissemination of green technologies through patents alone. Yet
complex technologies often cannot be understood and
implemented, especially by non-experts working in the developing
world, merely through patent disclosures.82 Some form of
79. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, analyzed the data on web hits in an earlier study
to find a highly skewed distribution of hits, only thirty-six patents received any hits.
Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a positive correlation between web hits and
forward citations by other patents.
80. It is worth pointing out that this situation is changing rapidly at the present time,
since Google patent search now includes the members of the patent family in its results.
However, this feature was not available during most of the life of the EcoPC.
81. See Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 37.
82. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Beyond Eureka: What Creators Want (Freedom, Credit,
and Audiences) and How Intellectual Property Can Better Give It to Them (by Supporting,
Sharing, Licensing, and Attribution), 114 U. MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1101–02 (reviewing
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technology assistance or transfer is generally required to enable
local users to take advantage of patented technologies, or even to
realize that such technologies are available and applicable to local
problems. This is especially the case with complex engineering and
infrastructural technologies.83 This issue was recognized by critics
soon after the formation of the EcoPC,84 and continued to be an
issue throughout the life of the organization.
5. Emphasis on the Developing World. One of the motivating
principles behind the EcoPC was that patents would be made
freely available to users in the developing world,85 much as the
MPP and NTD Pool focused on the pressing health needs of
underdeveloped countries.86 However, many of the EcoPC
contributed technologies had little relevance to industries in the
developing world. For example, one of IBM’s contributed patents
related to a technique for cleaning semiconductor wafers using
ozone gas to eliminate contaminants produced by chemical
cleaning processes.87 While this invention has a clear
environmental valence, it would seemingly be useful only in a few
industrialized countries that already have multi-billion dollar
semiconductor fabrication plants.
In addition, the focus on the developing world belies a
fundamental misunderstanding of the global patent system by
some of the EcoPC planners. Patents prevent usage of a patented
technology only in the countries where patents are issued. Most
companies do not seek patent protection in the least-developed
JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2015)); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 561 (2012).
83. See JOHN BARTON ET AL., INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY, REPORT OF THE UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 138, 146, 150 (2002), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprf
ullfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/572W-7DM9]; McManis & Contreras, supra note 10, at 127
(“Unlike essential medicines, many clean technologies are not consumer products, but
infrastructure improvements and capital projects such as wind farms, nuclear reactors,
transmission grids and carbon recapture retrofitting of existing factories. While aspects of
the design and operation of these facilities may be covered by patents, it is likely that
technical skill and know-how will be more critical in implementing these technologies in
the developing world.”).
84. See Srinivas, supra note 38, at 17 (“Mere availability of one or two patents in a
technology will not facilitate the transfer of [environmentally sustainable technologies] . . . .
[C]ommercialisation [sic] involves training, learning to adopt and make efficient use of the
technology. Therefore, while the availability of patents is necessary, it is not sufficient:
access alone will not result in meaningful technology transfers or the optimum use of
patents. There is thus a need to enable access to patents, but as part of a broader strategy
of transfer of [technology].”).
85. See Tripsas, supra note 35, at 5 (“[T]he hope is to encourage [the contributed
technologies’] widespread adoption, particularly in the developing world.”).
86. See Mattioli, supra note 29, at 121–27.
87. See U.S. Patent No. 6,178,973 (issued Jan. 30, 2001).
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countries, either because protection is uncertain in those
countries, or because their markets are underdeveloped and
procuring patent protection is not viewed as cost effective.88 Even
in middle-income countries, multinationals tend to focus on
pharmaceutical patenting and patenting in specific areas where
the country in question is competitive.89 Accordingly, many
technologies that are patented in the developed world are not
themselves patented in the developing world.90 This general rule
certainly applies to the patents contributed to the EcoPC, most of
which have “family” members throughout the developed world
(North America, Europe, Asia Pacific – see Table 4 below), but few
if any patent family members in the developing world. Thus,
organizations in the developing world already have the right to
exploit many technologies disclosed in patents filed in the
developed world. But they do not do so because, as discussed
above, the utilization of even moderately complex technologies is
not possible without significant training and technology transfer
activity that cannot be accomplished through the grant of patent
rights alone. In addition, technologies patented in the developed
world may not be targeted to needs in the developing world
without extensive further development.91
Ironically, the entities that would have most benefited from
the non-assertion covenants made by EcoPC members were
sophisticated firms in developed countries. At least one
representative acknowledged this, noting that the most likely user
of some of the company’s contributed patents would be
environmental service companies. Yet because the EcoPC made no
concerted outreach to promote the availability of contributed
technologies, even sophisticated firms were unlikely to find and
use these technologies.
6. Shift in Corporate Priorities. Several interview
respondents noted that corporate support for ESR initiatives

88. See generally AHN SANGHOON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 33–90 (2014) (explaining patenting strategies in developing countries).
89. See generally M.J. Abud et al., The Use of Intellectual Property in Chile (World
Intell. Prop. Org., Working Paper No. 11, 2013); Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers,
The Impact of International Patent Systems: Evidence from Accession to the European
Patent Convention (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24207, 2018).
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
91. The importance of technology transfer to the developing world in the area of
green/cleantech has been emphasized before. See, e.g., Joy Y. Xiang, Addressing Climate
Change: Domestic Innovation, International Aid and Collaboration, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP. & ENT. L. 196, 212–22 (2016) (surveying international agreements and efforts toward
transfer of environmental technologies to developing world); Reichman et al., supra note
10, at 25–37.
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within their own companies had lagged during the life of the
EcoPC, and that budgetary and resource constraints resulted in a
de-emphasis of ESR initiatives. Some speculated that these
industry-wide trends may have affected the willingness of new
members to join the EcoPC. At least one interview subject
identified his own company’s declining commitment to
sustainability during the period in which the EcoPC was in effect.
IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In this Part, we used the data on patents pledged to the EcoPC
and their matched controls to analyze: (1) the legal status of EcoPC
patents to gauge whether member companies considered
continued ownership of their pledged patents as sufficiently
important to incur the associated costs; and (2) the diffusion of the
technologies protected by patents pledged to the EcoPC as
measured by citations received from other patents.
A. Data
For the purpose of our quantitative analysis, we updated the
database previously used by Hall and Helmers. This means that
for comparison purposes, we restricted the set of patents to all
patents pledged prior to July 2010, which excludes the four
families pledged by Hewlett-Packard and Hitachi.92 We also
included the original control patents, which had been obtained by
propensity score matching on priority year, IPC subclass, and
publication authority.
Updating the data turned out to be somewhat complex, partly
because the original data were drawn from a PATSTAT version
with non-permanent identifiers, and partly because PATSTAT
itself changes over time, with some data disappearing due to
changes in the data at the contributing national or regional patent
offices. In addition, the list of patents on the EcoPC website
appears to have changed slightly, to some extent in response to our
comments on the original list (incorrect numbers, etc.). We used
the April 2017 PATSTAT version and identified a correspondence
between the prior identifying numbers and the permanent (as of
April 2011) identifiers using information on the application
number and authority of the relevant patents. In a few cases, we
were unable to find the application number-authority combination
92. In the case of the Hitachi patent, it is not clear that the patent was ever listed on
EcoPC’s public website. All versions of the EcoPC list of patents that we were able to locate
using web archive tools were current only as of May 2011, prior to Hitachi’s joining.
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on the new version of PATSTAT. There were four such
applications from the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), which
apparently had been withdrawn and are no longer on its website.93
We included them in our forward citation analysis as having zero
cites, for completeness. In addition, twenty-four applications from
the Australian Patent Office (APO) were reduced to twelve
applications in the new PATSTAT file. Most of these problems
affected the control patents rather than the Eco-patents.
The resulting dataset contains 698 applications rather than
the original 711, with the distribution shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Dataset Construction

Number of applications
Controls
Eco-patents
Number of equivalence groups
Controls
Eco-patents
Number of citations
Controls
Eco-patents

Old (2011 data)
711
473
238
184
94
90
1872
1205
667

New (2017 data)
698
461
237
184
94
90
4056
2713
1343

Note: Controls matched based on the publication authorities, priority years, and IPC
classes of the EcoPC patents.

From Table 2, one can see that although the set of
applications has changed slightly, we still have the same number
of equivalent groups for the patents to be analyzed. It is also clear
that the number of citations to both the EcoPC patents and
controls has grown considerably, more than doubling in both
cases.94
For our inventor survey, we extracted from PATSTAT the
names of all inventors of all 329 patents that cited an EcoPC
patent after the patent had been pledged to the commons. We then
focused only on those patents where the citation to the EcoPC
patent was not added by the examiner. This left us with 141
93. One problem with searching for JPO patents, especially the earlier ones, is that
the numbering systems are quite complex and some numbers are apparently reused
occasionally. See Tips of Performing Japanese Patent Numbers Search, PRIOR ART SEARCH
& TRANSLATION, http://www.searchpriorart.com/search_tips/patent_no_search.htm [http
s://perma.cc/WBC2-MWGY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (explaining the complexities of
Japanese patent numbering). This problem leads to apparent errors on the Espacenet and
Google patents websites. We also found that at least two of the equivalent patents we had
identified for the controls became utility model patents when they were granted in Japan.
94. See infra Section IV.C for further analysis of the citations.
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patents (43%). After undertaking some name-cleaning and
harmonization, we obtained a total of 271 inventors. We then
searched the web for their contact information. We were able to
send our short questionnaire, which consisted of only three
questions, to seventy-one (26%) inventors. We obtained responses
from thirteen inventors, a response rate of 18%. However, only ten
of these thirteen inventors agreed to answer our questionnaire.
These ten inventors worked for four different EcoPC member
companies: three inventors worked for Bosch, three for IBM, three
for DuPont and one for Xerox. These are the four firms that
contributed the largest number of patents to the commons.95 We
summarize the results briefly in Section IV.C, below.
B. Legal Status of the Pledged Patents
We began by looking at the legal status of the EcoPC pledged
patents as of July 2017, summarized in Table 3. We collected these
data from PATSTAT’s legal status tables of April 2017 and
supplemented the information using web searches. The WO (PCT)
patents in our database will not have a post-grant legal status
since they are granted on a national basis, and a few patent
applications from the JPO could not be found, probably because
the PATSTAT entries were for translations or they were utility
model applications in Japan, even though they might have been
patent applications elsewhere. There are fifteen such patents for
which we did not have legal status, or legal status is meaningless.
Of the remaining 221 patent applications, almost 20% of the
ninety priority patents were still in force as of July 2017, but only
11% of all the equivalent patents. Of the twenty-seven patents still
in force or pending, twelve are U.S. patents, six are Japanese, four
are European Patent Office (EPO) or German, and the remainder
are Chinese (one), Russian (two), Mexican (one), and Korean (one).
Almost half the patents have expired for nonpayment of fees,
although almost as many expired at the end of their terms.

95.

See supra Table 2.
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Table 3: Legal Status of Eco-Patents – July 2017

pending
granted and in force

All
8
19

Priority
3
14

All
3.4%
8.1%

Priority
3.3%
15.6%

Total still active
nonpayment of fees
expired at term
rejected
withdrawn
Total not active
missing (from JPO)*
WO applications
Total

27
90
61
18
24
193
5
11
236

17
29
30
7
7
73
0
0
90

11.4%
38.1%
25.8%
7.6%
10.2%
81.8%
2.1%
4.7%

18.9%
32.2%
33.3%
7.8%
7.8%
81.1%
0.0%
0.0%

*These appear to be translation entries or utility models.

In Figure 1 below, we show the distribution of patent lifetimes
(approximated by the lapse (expiration or nonpayment) dates
minus the application filing date).96 In the case of patents still in
force, we measured the lifetime to July 2017. The distribution is
fairly flat for those patents that did not remain in force for their
full terms. A substantial number of patents remained in force for
either the full 20-year patent term or a significant portion of it.
This suggests that in many cases, companies decided to pay
renewal fees to keep the patents in force even after they had been
pledged to the EcoPC.97 For example JP4696713 “Wastewater
treatment process”98 by Fuji Xerox is still in force in four out of five
jurisdictions in which it was filed. Other patents still in force
include Sony’s JP3876497 “Flocculating agent and a method for
flocculation,”99 which was granted in early 2007, and IBM’s
96. Most jurisdictions now have a common patent term: 20 years from the filing date,
but there are various exceptions, and older patents in our sample may have been issued
under different rules. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INDICATORS 42 (2009), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941
/wipo_pub_941.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV96-JRJL]. When we were able to obtain the actual
expiration date, we used that (most cases).
97. Renewal fees usually increase over time. At the USPTO for example, large
entities pay $1,600 to maintain a patent in force 3.5 years after grant and $7,400 11.5 years
after grant. See USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov
/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule.html
[https://perma.cc/PZ8E-RG8B] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
98. See JP Patent No. 4,696,713 (issued June 8, 2011); see also Waste Water
Treatment Method, GOOGLE PAT., https://patents.google.com/patent/JP4696713B2/en [htt
ps://perma.cc/U6KA-BNNL] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
99. See JP Patent No. 3,876,497 (issued Jan. 31, 2007); see also Flocculants and

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156

57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019)

2019]

ECO-PATENT COMMONS

89

US6294028
“Mercury
process
gold
ballbond
removal
apparatus,”100 which was granted in 2001 and maintained in force
throughout the entire lifetime of the EcoPC. However, there are
also patents such as US5050676 “Apparatus for two phase vacuum
extraction of soil contaminants”101 owned by Xerox; the patent has
five equivalents, four of which had expired before the patent was
pledged, and the remaining patent expired at term less than a year
and a half after the patent was pledged and no maintenance fees
were payable during that time. This is an example of the pledge of
a patent that most likely no longer had any value to the company.
Figure 1: Patent Lifetime Distribution for Eco-Patents

Figure 2 below breaks down the different reasons why patents
lapsed. It shows that a significant number of patents have expired
since 2007, the year before the EcoPC was launched. A few patents
were rejected by the relevant patent offices or were withdrawn by
applicants, but the majority lapsed due to nonpayment of renewal
fees.

Coagulation Method Using the Same, GOOGLE PAT., https://patents.google.com/patent/JP38
76497B2/en?oq=JP3876497 [https://perma.cc/YGT5-5W3T] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
100. See U.S. Patent No. 6,294,028 (issued Sept. 25, 2001).
101. See U.S. Patent No. 5,050,676 (issued Sept. 24, 1991).
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Figure 2: Lapse Trends for Eco-Patents

Table 4 below shows the geographic coverage of the EcoPC
patents. Ninety percent of the priority patent applications were
made to the four most important jurisdictions: the U.S., Germany,
Japan, and the EPO, and these jurisdictions account for 80% of the
patents overall. There is very little evidence that the patents in
the commons ever covered less-developed countries. The only
patents in middle-income countries are in Brazil (seven), Mexico
(four), and Argentina (one), and there are none in low-income
countries. The lack of patents in low-income areas shows that
patents could not have been an obstacle to the use of technologies
in less-developed countries.
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Table 4: Application Authority Distribution
Authority
USA
Germany
Japan
EPO
South Korea
China
Austria
Spain
UK
Norway
Denmark
Brazil
Canada
Mexico
Australia
Russia
Argentina
France
Hong Kong
Israel
Total

US
DE
JP
EP
KR
CN
AT
ES
GB
NO
DK
BR
CA
MX
AU
RU
AR
FR
HK
IL

Priorities
34
20
17
10
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

90

All
75
45
34
34
7
3
4
4
2
2
1
7
7
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
237

C. Technology Diffusion and Follow-On Innovation
Next, we reexamine the question of technology diffusion by
looking at the updated citation data. Hall and Helmers have
previously
suggested
that
pledged
patents
protect
environmentally friendly technologies that could have the
potential to be adopted for use by third parties.102 To analyze any
effect on diffusion, we adopt a difference-in-differences estimation,
comparing the number of forward citations received by patents
pledged to the EcoPC before and after they were pledged to
citations received by the set of matched control patents that were
not pledged to the EcoPC. Our estimation approach allows for
different citation patterns between the set of EcoPC and control
patents before the EcoPC patents were pledged. This accounts for
concerns that pre-pledge citation behavior could be correlated with
the decision to pledge a given patent to the EcoPC.
Table 5 below shows a comparison of standard patent
characteristics between the set of patents pledged to the EcoPC
and the matched (by priority year, IPC subclass, and publication
102.

Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 34–35.
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authority) control patents where we focus on the priority patents
(Table A-1 in the Appendix shows the data for all equivalents).
There are no statistically significant differences between the grant
lag, the number of backward or non-patent literature references
between the two sets of patents. Interestingly, EcoPC patents are
more frequently granted. However, control patents have a larger
family size and a larger number of claims, both of which are
commonly used patent value indicators. This suggests that the
EcoPC patents are potentially of less value than otherwise
comparable patents. When we look at the number of forward
citations received, the set of control patents accumulated a larger
average number of citations than the pledged patents.
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Table 5: Mean Patent Characteristics for eighty-nine EcoPatents and ninety Control Patents
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Table 6 below shows the share of EcoPC and control patents
that receive any citations as well as the average number of
citations received.103 As indicated earlier, compared to Table 6 in
Hall and Helmers prior work,104 there are slightly fewer
equivalents of our EcoPC patents and controls due to missing data
and the consolidation at the APO. The share of patents that have
citations has increased, becoming close to 90% for the equivalence
groups, and the average citations per equivalence group has more
than doubled. None of these results are unexpected, given the
additional five years of data, as well as probable improvements in
the PATSTAT coverage itself, but these results also highlight our
much improved ability to assess the question of technology
diffusion as a result of the EcoPC.
Table 6: Citation Counts for EcoPC Patents and Controls
all patents
Eco-patents
Controls

equivalence
group

Total patents
237
90
461
94

all patents

equivalence
group

Share with citations
73.0%
85.6%
57.1%
93.6%

all patents
Total citations
1343
2713

Average citations*
Average citations**
Eco-patents
10.5
17.4
5.7
14.9
Controls
13.2
30.8
5.9
28.9
Note: Citations are measured as all forward citations in the patent literature between
the application date and April/May 2017, adjusted for citations by equivalent patents
in other jurisdictions.
* Average over patents with nonzero citations.
** Average over all patents.

Table 7 and Figure 3 below show the key results of our new
analysis. Poisson and negative binomial models of citations at the
patent-level show that EcoPC patents are half as likely to be cited
than the controls (an elasticity of 0.4–0.6), and even less likely
after donation, although this last result is only marginally
significant. These regressions control for both priority year and the
citation lag using dummies.
It is well-known that the citation lag distribution for patents
has a somewhat smooth structure, rising at first to a peak at three
to five years and then declining slowly.105 We therefore attempt to
103. See infra Table A-2 (showing a comparison of patent characteristics for patents
with nonzero forward citations).
104. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 45–46.
105. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights
and Methodological Tools 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498,
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improve the precision of our estimates by imposing the JaffeTrajtenberg model of citation diffusion and decline106 rather than
using the citation lag dummies. This model, shown in the final
three columns of Table 7 below, uses a parametric model for the
citation lag that is given by the following equation:
cst = b 0 (1 + deco Deco + dafter Dafter ) f (t ) exp[- b 1(1 + b 1e Deco )s ][1 - exp( b 2 (1 + b 2e Deco ) s)] + est

Where “t” is the priority year of the cited patent, “s” is the
citation lag, and “cst” is the citation rate (the number of citations
at that lag per sample patents available to be cited). f(t) is modeled
as a set of priority year dummies. That is, the unit of observation
is the average cites per patents with a given priority year, citation
lag, and patent type (EcoPC patent before and after or control).
Prior experience with this specification suggests that although it
is an appealing model in that it captures both the initial increase
in citation due to knowledge diffusion and the decline due to
knowledge age, it is quite difficult to estimate successfully.107 We
do it in two ways: (1) nonlinear least squares with a dependent
variable equal to average cites per patent; and (2) Poisson with a
dependent variable equal to the total cites at the given lag to
patents with a given priority year. In the latter case, we multiply
the right-hand side of the model by the number of patents, so the
models are equivalent. The results of the two estimation strategies
are similar. Once we impose a model on the citation lag, the EcoPC
patents are cited an average of 25% less than the controls, and
there is no change after donation. The decay (obsolescence) and
diffusion parameters are similar to those obtained by Hall and
collaborators108 for the U.S. patent data, with obsolescence
increasing by about 5% per year, and diffusion about 50%.
However, keep in mind that one reason the first is relatively low
and the second relatively high is that there is a secular growth in
citations that is not completely captured by the priority year
dummies. That is, this model imposes a fixed citation lag structure
on the data which is then allowed to be higher or lower, depending
on priority year and EcoPC status. Because citations are often
added by examiners rather than applicants,109 we also report
2001); Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, International Knowledge Flows: Evidence from
Patent Citations 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6507, 1998).
106. Jaffe & Trajtenberg, supra note 105, at 19.
107. Hall et al., supra note 105, 29–33.
108. Id. at 33.
109. Note that for the purposes of analyzing diffusion, it is preferable to include
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results in Appendix Table A-3 and Figure B-1 where we retain only
citations made by applicants. That said, the results are very
similar to the ones reported in Table 7 and Figure 3; there is no
evidence of increased diffusion of patents after they were pledged
to the EcoPC.

citations added by examiners because these citations also indicate that the citing patent
builds on the cited prior art where this relationship was identified by examiners who are
commonly experts in the relevant technology areas.
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Figure 3: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
Cites per patent by citing year (as of May 2017)
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Eco-pats fitted

Table 7 and Figure 3 show that there is little change in
aggregate citation differences between EcoPC patents and controls
before and after being pledged to the commons, although EcoPC
patents are cited less overall. It is important to remember,
however, that because the pledging firms retain a defensive
termination right, there may be continuing innovation building on
these patents that does not result in new patent applications (and
citations). That is, there are limits created on the enforcement of
patent rights by the firms that use the technologies in these
patents, which may reduce the benefits of subsequent patenting,
and thus reduce citations to the pledged patent. This issue is
related to a broader problem: our analysis of diffusion only looks
for diffusion that leads to follow-on innovation that is patented.
This excludes simple use of pledged patented technologies and
even follow-on innovation if it does not lead to a patent filing.
However, in the absence of any information on the use of pledged
patents,110 the forward citation analysis is the only way to
quantitatively assess the impact of the patent pledge on diffusion.
It is also possible that the nature of the citation changes, in
that the technology in the patents becomes more useful to
individuals and nonprofit institutions given the absence of royalty
requirements. We investigate this question by looking at the

110.

See supra Part II.
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source of the citations to the EcoPC patents and controls before
and after donation. We divide the cites into five groupings
according to their source: (1) self-citations from the firm that owns
the pledged patent; (2) citations from other EcoPC participants; (3)
citations from other firms; (4) citations from individual patentees;
and (5) citations from non-profit institutions (universities,
hospitals,
public
research organizations
(PROs),
and
governments). We then define the before and after period for each
grouping of citations according to the relation between the earliest
priority date for the citing patent and the date the cited patent was
donated to the commons. The results are shown in Table 8 below.
In some cases, sample sizes are fairly small, but it does appear
that self-citation falls relative to all the other categories, with the
largest increases (by percentage) in citations by other EcoPC
participants and non-profit institutions.
One issue that arises when counting the source of citations is
that many patents have multiple applicants of different types.
Given the nonrivalry of knowledge, which implies that one citer’s
use of the knowledge in a patent does not depend on use by another
citer, it might be appropriate to simply count all the applicantcitations as citations as we did in the first panel of Table 8.
Nevertheless, we also show a weighted version of the table in the
second panel where the weights are proportional to the inverse of
the number of applicants on the citing patent.111 Although the
distribution of cites changes dramatically when we weight, due to
the tendency of individuals to share in applications, the
qualitative conclusions with respect to the post-commons citing
behavior are the same.

111. We removed individual inventor-applicants where there was also a firm applicant
before computing the weights, on the grounds that these applicants usually are employed
by the firm in question.
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Table 8: Citations to the Eco-Patents by Citer Type

D. Inventor Awareness
As described in Section IV.A, in order to validate our
quantitative results, we asked the inventors of patents that cited
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an EcoPC patent after it was pledged: (a) whether they were aware
of the citation (we exclude citations added by examiners); (b) if
they were aware of the citation, whether they knew that the cited
patent was part of the EcoPC; and (c) if they answered (a) and (b)
affirmatively, whether the fact that the EcoPC patent was
available for use royalty-free played any role in their decision to
rely on it as prior art. As Section IV.A explains, we obtained valid
responses from ten inventors; 50% indicated that they were aware
of the citation, but none of them were aware that the cited patent
was part of the EcoPC. While the sample of inventors is obviously
very small, it nevertheless confirms our quantitative results: the
pledge of a patent to the EcoPC was ineffective in spurring the
diffusion of the patented invention. In fact, the responses from the
inventors also confirm the results of our interviews with company
representatives as they suggest that inventors were unaware of
the EcoPC even when they relied on patents that were part of the
EcoPC as prior art.
V. ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS
The results of our analysis suggest fairly strongly that the
technologies covered by the contributed patents did not in fact
attract significant interest by third parties, even before
contribution to the commons. As a result, pledging these patents
to the commons did not affect the interest of third parties in their
underlying technologies and hence the commons did not promote
their use and diffusion.
There is a growing literature concerning the factors that
motivate patent holders to join patent pooling arrangements and
seeking to understand why some patent holders elect not to join
such pools.112 The potential for monetary gain, which is central to
many pooling decisions, is not a factor with respect to
philanthropic and CSR-oriented pools such as EcoPC. Also, unlike
the MPP and the NTD Pool, the EcoPC lacked significant
governmental support and incentives,113 perhaps making its path
more challenging from the outset.
One of the reasons for the EcoPC’s lack of effectiveness is
likely the fact that it was conceived and implemented by the
suppliers of technology as a volunteer effort without consulting the

112. See Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 21, at 294–95; Michael Mattioli, Patent
Pool Outsiders, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 225, 240 (2018).
113. See Mattioli, supra note 29, at 125–27 (describing governmental support and
incentives in connection with MPP and NTD Pool).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466156

57 HOUS. L. REV. 61 (2019)

102

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[57:1

demand side (potential users of these patents/technologies).114 As
such, the EcoPC was constructed in such a way that it was not
easy for potential users to understand how the available
technologies could be used. It simply offered a passive website with
patent listings, rather than suggestions on how these technologies
could be utilized, either separately or together.115 Our results
suggest that effective technology diffusion requires more than
patent non-assertion, especially in the developing world. As
discussed above, technical assistance and technology/know-how
transfer are essential for implementing environmental
technologies to an even greater degree than for software or
pharma, and patent disclosures alone are seldom sufficient to
enable someone to implement a technology effectively.116
Likewise, there was little or no coordination among EcoPC
contributors regarding the technologies covered by the patents
they were pledging. As previously discussed by Hall and
Helmers,117 the pledged patents appeared largely to protect
different technologies. Hence, the implementation of a given
technology might not have been possible using only pledged
patents (i.e., any of the covered technologies could require the use
of additional patents not contributed to the commons). As a result,
synergies that could have emerged from the contribution of
multiple patents covering selected technologies did not emerge.
Related to the previous point, the EcoPC was organized as a
volunteer effort. Members paid no fees, and the WBCSD and ELI
managed the organization largely as an accommodation to IBM.
Without payment, ancillary value-added services are unlikely to
be provided. This being said, some interviewees stated that their
companies would not have joined EcoPC had they been required to
pay membership fees. So, there is a clear trade-off, or perhaps a
114. A different approach has been attempted by WIPO Green, an online technology
exchange platform that allows both potential technology users and suppliers to specify their
needs and to find suitable transaction partners. See WIPO GREEN – The Marketplace for
Sustainable Technology, WIPO, https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/en/ [https://perma.cc/5E
8E-X22P] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). Though WIPO Green has been operational since
2013, it is not clear that any substantial number of transactions are being effected using
the platform, and several improvements have been suggested by commentators. See Joy Y.
Xiang, IPR Management in International Cleantech Cooperation, 32 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV.
48–50 (forthcoming 2019).
115. A similarly unsuccessful supply-side model for patents can be found in the IPXI
Exchange, an attempt to offer unitized licenses of pooled patents essential to certain
industry standards. Like the EcoPC, IPXI failed to achieve significant take-up and
eventually discontinued its operations. See Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure:
IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419,
432–39 (2016).
116. See supra notes 82–83.
117. Hall & Helmers, supra note 41, at 34–36.
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need for public support or a tax incentive if an activity such as
EcoPC is viewed as socially desirable. This also means that the
ability to distribute the fixed costs associated with managing such
an institution favors an approach that brings together a larger
number of participating companies than the EcoPC.
Low membership can be attributed, in part, to the cost of the
internal patent analysis that was required to contribute. Several
of the original EcoPC participants were large, sophisticated
organizations with internal patent analytical resources and a clear
understanding of which patents would, and would not, advance
corporate goals. Other firms may not have wanted to risk giving
away a patent that could have potential value. Likewise, the
internal effort of identifying these patents, without a clear payoff,
may not have been viewed as worth the effort by overworked
patent counsel.
Perhaps the most cogent critique of the EcoPC was its failure
to track patent utilization. Without knowledge of how/whether
patents were being utilized, companies could not justify expending
further effort on the activity. Moreover, even the PR benefit of
belonging to the EcoPC waned after the initial contributions, given
that there were no ‘success stories’ to promote. More generally, the
lack of information on usage meant that it was very difficult to
gauge the success of the initiative and to make adjustments to its
structure and management to improve its performance. Finally,
the lack of demonstrable results from the project eroded the
potential PR benefits that member firms may have hoped to
achieve from participation in the EcoPC.
The lack of usage tracking underscores another weakness of
the EcoPC, especially when compared to more successful pledge
communities: the lack of dedicated administrative and managerial
resources devoted to expanding and promoting the commons.
While EcoPC was housed within well-established organizations
such as WBCSD and ELI, these organizations received no
additional compensation for managing the EcoPC and appear to
have taken on this role as an accommodation to a significant
member (IBM). Most trade associations have dedicated personnel
for membership development, and enrolling members takes
significant time and effort. Without these resources, it is not
surprising that the EcoPC was unable to recruit a larger body of
members nor that WBCSD and ELI spent few additional funds for
EcoPC recruitment. As the example of DPL has shown,118 the lack
of dedicated managerial and promotional resources can contribute
118.

Contreras, Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, supra note 5, at 567–68.
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to the failure of a pledge community to gain significant traction in
the marketplace.
These difficulties and potential missteps in implementing the
EcoPC almost certainly contributed to its demise, but they may
not have been the only reasons that the EcoPC failed. Mattioli,
writing near the peak of the EcoPC’s activity, observed the diffuse
and overly broad nature of the EcoPC’s scope: reducing
environmental harm.119 This broad remit, in contrast to the goals
of the narrowly focused MPP and NTD Pool, could have made it
more difficult for potential licensees to conceptualize solutions to
particular environmental problems using the tools offered by the
EcoPC.
More generally, however, the EcoPC may have been a victim
of changing corporate priorities in the global business
environment. When IBM introduced the idea of the EcoPC to other
large corporations in 2006, corporate sustainability had recently
gone mainstream.120 Many large corporations were experimenting
with sustainability strategies and campaigns. The global economic
recession that followed, however, served to constrain the social
programs promoted by firms, including sustainability programs.121
One of the ways in which ESR programs may have been “trimmed”
during hard economic times was by emphasizing those
programmatic components that would appeal specifically to
consumers and de-emphasizing others.122 The EcoPC, which was,
almost by definition, tangential to the principal product markets
in which its participants operated, may have had little direct
impact on participants’ customer relations. As such, attention to
initiatives such as the EcoPC may have waned over the years of
the global economic downturn, until the project finally withered
entirely in 2016. This possibility is corroborated by the fact that at
least half of the corporate EcoPC representatives whom we
interviewed were retired at the time of our interview. The EcoPC
and the ideals that it embodied may have been the product of a
prior generation of corporate managers. If this is the case, then
new commons efforts in the environmental space will need to
develop strategies to rekindle corporate interest in ESR and greentechnology solutions.

119.
120.

Mattioli, supra note 29, at 155.
See Just Good Business: A Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 19, 2008), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2008/01/19/just-goo
d-business [https://perma.cc/Y9KH-NXFH] (interviewing Daniel Franklin).
121. See Michael L. Barnett et al., Sustainability Strategy in Constrained Economic
Times, 48 LONG RANGE PLANNING 63, 64 (2015).
122. Id. at 66.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The EcoPC represented a novel and ambitious cooperative
activity by leading international firms to improve environmental
sustainability through the contribution of under-utilized, non-core
patents to a publicly-accessible pool. Though the participants in
the EcoPC represented some of the largest and most influential
patent holders in the world, our results demonstrate that the effort
achieved only modest results and contributed little to technology
diffusion. There are numerous reasons hypothesized for the failure
of the EcoPC, ranging from defects in implementation, reporting
and management, to a general shift away from corporate
environmental and sustainability programs lacking direct
customer benefits. Future initiatives seeking to make green
technologies more widely available should consider the lessons
learned from the EcoPC. There are clear trade-offs between costs
and benefits that organizers of future efforts should consider.
The experience of the EcoPC, even though it did not realize its
ambitious goals, has helped to advance our understanding of how
patent commons can work and fail to work. As such, the EcoPC
has made an undeniable contribution to the study of patent
commons and pledges. The failure of the EcoPC to achieve
significant technology diffusion and to attract significant
corporate participation should not be viewed as a failure of the
patent commons model itself. Instead, this worthwhile effort
should be viewed as an invitation to experiment further with, and
to improve upon, the patent commons model both in the area of
green technologies and beyond.
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table A-1: Mean Patent Characteristics for 236 Eco-Patents
and 454 Control Patents
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Table A-2: Patents with Nonzero Forward Cites Only
(437 Controls; 218 Eco-Patents)
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Table A-3: Applicant Cites Only
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL FIGURE
Figure B-1: Applicant Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of
May 2017)
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